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Chaque matin avant l’ouverture du Nasdaq il y a une session durant
laquelle les faiseurs de marché font des cotations sans exécutions d'ordres. Malgré
le fait qu'il n'y a pas de transactions pendant cette période, il s'y produit une activité
importante de soumission et de révision des cotations. Nous étudions l'information
révélée par les cotations de prix d'achat et de vente. Notre banque de données
contient l'identification des participants, ce qui nous permet de tester plusieurs
hypothèses sur la dynamique de la formation du prix d'ouverture. Nous trouvons
notamment que certains faiseurs de marché prennent un role de leaders.
One fundamental issue in the study of market microstructures is that of
price discovery. While most existing studies focus on the trading period, little is
known whether and how much the non-trading period contributes to the price
discovery. This paper offers a new perspective on the price discovery process by
studying market makers’ posting and revising of non-binding prices on Nasdaq
during the one-and-half hours pre-opening period. We examine a unique data set
containing all the market maker quotes and identifications collected for 50 of the
most active Nasdaq stocks. Our empirical investigation shows there is strong
evidence that non-binding prices contain information, and there is significant price
discovery during the pre-opening period. In the absence of trades, Nasdaq dealers
use locked market notes (e.g., the situation where the best bid price among all
market makers is greater than the best ask) as an important device to indicate to
other market makers which direction the price should move and what the opening
price should be. Furthermore, we find evidence that there exists a leadership
pattern among market makers, particularly for the most active stocks.
Mots Clés : Prix d'achat et de vente, pré-ouverture, Nasdaq
Keywords : Bid and ask prices, locked market quotes, pre-opening period,
price discovery, Nasdaq market makers
JEL : G10, G12, G13
Introduction
One of the fundamental issues in the study of market microstructures
is that of price discovery which is the incorporation of new information
into the security price. Numerous theoretical studies have developed
structural models which provide important insights into the learning
process faced by market makers.
1
These studies consider an asymmetric
information setting, where buyers and sellers are better informed than
market makers. The informational impact of a trade is perceived as
the market makers' estimate of the private information of a transaction.
Market makers learn about the fundamental value of the underlying asset
from the sequence and timing of trades which reveal the motivation of
traders and their private information. Viewed from this perspective, the
trading process contains the information that subsequently appears in
prices. On the empirical front, there are extensive studies which analyze
price and trade data and their information content, with a focus on
price-discovery during trading periods.
2
This paper oers a new perspective on the price discovery process, the
price discovery during pre-trading periods, by studying market makers'
activity on Nasdaq prior to the market opening. We examine a unique
data set collected during the pre-opening period for 50 of the most active
Nasdaq rms from October 1, 1995 to September 31, 1996. The data set
contains all themarket maker quotes and identications. The availability
of the market maker identications makes it possible to examine many
issues hitherto unaddressed in the literature.
Despite the potential importance of pre-opening activity for price
discovery, the research on this topic is only emerging. Biais, Hillion
and Spatt (1996) were the rst to conduct a comprehensive study of
pre-opening activity using data from the Paris Bourse. They test al-
ternative hypotheses regarding whether pre-opening prices reect pure
noise, rational learning or noisy learning and found that the informa-
tional content of the pre-opening prices increases steadily as the opening
1
Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley
and O'Hara (1987) are only a few of the many prominent papers on the subject. For
a unied exposition and examination of the major models and theories in market
microstructures see O'Hara (1995).
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See for instance, Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1988), Harris (1990),
Hasbrouck (1991), Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman (1996), Madhavan, Richard-
son and Roomans (1997). For major U.S. equity markets, the trading period is from
9:30 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. Although o-hours trading is possible (e.g., Crossing Sections
I and II on the NYSE, and InstiNet on Nasdaq), its volume is negligible. For example,
the NYSE average volume was 412 million shares, while the Crossing Sections I and
II averaged 2.5 million shares per day in 1996, according to the NYSE Fact Book
(1996).
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of the market becomes more imminent. Madhavan and Panchapagesan
(1997) investigate the price discovery process at the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) open. They show, both theoretically and empirically,
that a specialist who observes the evolution and components of the limit
order book in the pre-opening period obtains valuable information and
he can facilitate price discovery at the open.
3
The nature of our data set
and the institutional settings of Nasdaq allow us to go much deeper into
many of the issues raised in this literature. In particular, from the per-
spective of theoretical developments about price discovery, many game
theorists study games of coordination and pre-play without rm commit-
ments. However, the empirical evidence is sparse. The phenomenon of
pre-opening activity on Nasdaq provides an interesting case for studying
the nature of the communication game in the absence of rm commit-
ments.
Nasdaq market makers may start to enter bid-ask quotes shortly
after 8:00 a.m. They are able to revise their quotes before the opening
of Nasdaq at 9:30 a.m. Hence, they are not obligated to honor any quotes
during this pre-opening period unless these prices prevail until the time
the market opens. During this pre-opening period there is an inter-dealer
market where real trades may take place. Therefore, one may wonder
whether the non-binding quotes have any value. Contrary to what one
might expect, trading volume on the inter-dealer market, InstiNet, is
negligible during the pre-opening while quote activity is very intense,
with many Nasdaq market makers frequently posting and revising their
bid and ask prices. Take the Intel Corporation as an example. During
our sample period, the number of pre-opening quotes averaged 118 per
day, with an average of 42 individual market makers participating. Why
do we observe this puzzling phenomenon that market makers prefer to
quote repeatedly without any commitment rather than actively trade on
the inter-dealer market? Does this suggest that there is a communication
value to the non-binding quotes and that price discovery takes place? If
this is the case, how does the price discovery mechanism work without
active trading? The answers to these questions have several components.
First, Nasdaq price quotes are submitted by market makers who have
an armative obligation to make a two-sided market in the stock dur-
ing regular trading hours.
4
On both the NYSE and the Paris Bourse,
all orders from the public and from dealers are intermingled and those
submitting orders to the exchange are not obligated to submit orders
3
We should also note the recent interest in the informational content of non-
binding quotes in the foreign exchange market, see for instance Evans (1997).
4
Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) provide a detailed analysis of the price discov-
ery process during Nasdaq trading hours and elaborate on its institutional aspects.
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on both sides of the market. We argue that the incentives for price dis-
covery among Nasdaq market makers is dierent from that of investors.
Namely, we explain why Nasdaq dealers have incentives to identify them-
selves in a communication mechanism and share their information before
trading starts.
Second, there is strong evidence that pre-opening non-binding price
quotes contain information, and there is signicant price discovery during
the pre-opening period. In our sample we nd that 17% of the daily
price change is attributable to the pre-opening period. These ndings
are consistent with those obtained by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1996) for
the Paris Bourse. In fact, if anything the presence of price discovery
during the pre-opening appears stronger on the Nasdaq compared to the
Paris Bourse.
Third, Nasdaq features a market quote mechanism which is a combi-
nation of the highest bid and lowest ask across all market makers.
5
We
discover that the market often involves locked market quotes during the
pre-opening. Such market quotes correspond to the situation where the
best bid is equal or higher than the best ask price. Pre-opening prices
have their unique characteristics: about 35% of them are locked market
quotes. In contrast, locked market quotes occur only 0.3% of the time
during regular trading hours.
6
Fourth, we need to explain why market makers choose to use the
mechanism of posting non-binding quotes despite the possibility of trad-
ing on the inter-dealer market. The latter involves anonymous trading,
however, while the posting of quotes during the Nasdaq pre-opening
reveals market maker ID's (that is Nasdaq market makers have level
2 access which displays the market maker ID's).
7
With many market
makers participating in the pre-opening and hundreds of quotes ashing
across screens there must be a way to communicate a desire to change
the market price quotes. Like someone standing on a box to address a
noisy and unorganized crowd one may conjecture that there is a Nasdaq
equivalent to standing on a box. Nasdaq market makers use locked mar-
ket quotes as an important device to inform other market makers which
direction the price should move and what the opening price should be.
We nd that the majority of price discovery takes place precisely during
5
Throughout this paper, we use the terminology market quote and best bid-ask
prices interchangeably. For any stock at any time, the market quotes are dened as
the pair of the lowest ask price and the highest bid price among all market makers
who quote on the stock.
6
In principle, market locks are not \allowed" during trading hours according to
Nasdaq regulations.
7
On the Paris Bourse market maker ID's are not revealed during the pre-opening
(nor during regular trading) unlike the Nasdaq.
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locked market conditions. We nd that this locked market condition is
the mechanism par excellence to signal price changes and is the core of
price discovery during the pre-opening on Nasdaq.
The game theory literature has coined the term cheap talk to desig-
nate situations like the pre-opening where Nasdaq market makers com-
municate without commitment (see Farrell and Rabin (1996) for a re-
cent survey). One may wonder whether there exist leadership patterns
among market makers. In particular, whether any particular market
maker or small group of market makers take a leading role in sending
credible signals to others when they possess valuable information. We
nd evidence of leadership in creating locked market conditions. First,
initiations of locks for certain market makers appear to be dispropor-
tional to their typical quote behavior during the pre-opening. Moreover,
there is a small group of market makers responsible for the majority of
the price contribution from locked markets. The top three market mak-
ers account for 49% of the price contribution from locked markets while
they only represent 9% of the quote frequency during the pre-opening.
Furthermore, for active stocks locked market returns associated with the
top three market makers are better predictors of the close-to-open re-
turn than locked market returns associated with the remaining market
makers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the institu-
tional environment of the Nasdaq pre-opening. Section 2 describes the
pre-opening data. Section 3 provides evidence of price discovery during
the pre-opening. In Section 4, we examine the dynamics of quotes dur-
ing the pre-opening and compare it to the regular trading quote pattern.
Section 5 addresses the leadership hypothesis. Concluding remarks are
oered in Section 6.
1 The Pre-Opening Session on Nasdaq
The Nasdaq Stock Market is an electronic securities market comprised
of competing market makers whose trading is supported by a communi-
cations network that includes quote dissemination, trade reporting and
order execution systems. Trading in individual stocks is characterized
by a multiple dealer market where participants are required to display
their individual bid and ask prices on the system. The reported market
quotes (e.g., the best bid-ask prices) consist of the highest bid and lowest
ask prices posted by the market makers. The Nasdaq reporting systems
updates the market quote whenever a dealer updates his prices and ei-
ther exceeds the highest bid or under-cuts the lowest ask and therefore
4
aects the existing best bid-ask prices.
Although the trading system opens at 9:30 a.m., the quotation re-
porting system of Nasdaq opens much earlier. The rst quotation of the
day typically is around 8:15 a.m., with the earliest occurrences of quotes
at 8:00 a.m. During the one and half hour pre-opening period (from 8:00
to 9:30 a.m.), market makers are able to transmit their bid-ask prices,
display arriving customer orders, observe other dealers' prices, identify
the dealers present, and most importantly revise their prices. One impor-
tant dierence between the pre-opening prices and prices quoted during
trading hours is that pre-opening prices are a non-binding commitment.
In contrast, dealers are obligated to honor their prices for the minimum
quantity of 1000 shares during trading hours. Dealers have the ability
to execute trades during the pre-opening on the inter-dealer Electronic
Crossing Network (ECN) markets, however, trading activity is negligi-
ble.
8
The Nasdaq system contains no formal order matching procedure
for the opening of trading. At 9:30 a.m., Nasdaq market makers may
begin entering trades into the system. Individual market makers are
expected to enter transactions in chronological sequence within 90 sec-
onds of execution. These conditions prevail throughout the trading day.
In contrast, market makers are under no obligation to quote during the
pre-opening period. This raises the question why they would quote at
all. To address this, we need to consider the institutional issues of the
best bid-ask price, the customary practice for quoting volume, Nasdaq
rules on best execution, the stability of the population of active market
makers in a given stock over time, and the role of preferencing.
9
In principle, any informed market maker with short-lived private
information regarding order ow or prospects for the company's stock
could choose not to reveal his information prior to the market opening
and exploit the value of the information when trading starts. However,
under Nasdaq rules the counter-party dealer is only obligated to trade
his posted volume or the Nasdaq minimum (1000 shares for our stocks)
8
There are a number of ECNs, the most active of which is InstiNet. Using the
Trade and Quote (TAQ) database to extract ECN trades before 9:30 a.m., the pre-
opening volume is about 0.5% of the volume traded between 9:30 a.m. and 4:00
p.m. To identify such trades we used Rule 6620 trades. Rule 6620 requires that all
trades, including InstiNet trades during the pre-opening by Nasdaq member rms be
reported.
9
Preferencing refers to the practice of directing an order to any market maker
who has agreed in advance to execute orders at the best quoted price, regardless of
the prices actually quoted by the market maker to whom the order is directed. As a
result, market makers who oer the best price do not necessarily attract more order
ow. According to Godek (1996), virtually all Nasdaq market makers are preference
traders. Also see Battalio, Greene and Jennings (1995).
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at that market maker's posted price. In practice, Nasdaq dealers rou-
tinely posted the minimum volume during our sample period. So an
informed dealer may be limited in his ability to purchase (or sell) a large
number of shares. On the other hand, the informed dealer also has the
obligation to act as a market maker and quote a two sided market. Fur-
thermore, a market maker receiving an order to trade must execute that
trade consistent with Nasdaq rules on best execution, typically at the
prevailing best bid-ask spread. If the informed dealer receives a customer
order on the same side of the market, he must either execute that order
against his own account or allow the order to trade ahead of him against
the uninformed dealer. The problem of exploiting private information is
compounded if the informed market maker has a preferencing contract
and is obligated to trade the customer order at the prevailing best bid-
ask spread against his own account. A nal point is that stability of the
registered market maker community in a stock makes the pre-opening a
repeated game where reputation may limit the ability of informed deal-
ers to take advantage of their information by trading against their fellow
market makers. A market maker who exploits his information at the
expense of other dealers may nd them unwilling to trade with him in
the future. In conclusion, an informed market maker may be unable to
trade on his information and is at risk to have to trade shares against
public orders that are on the same side of the market as the informed
market maker. Informed market makers also recognize that other mar-
ket makers may be in a similar position either on the same day or any
other.
Taken together, these institutional factors limit the ability of market
makers to act as informed traders and exploit their private information
as in Kyle (1985). Furthermore, non-market makers can exploit private
information against the market maker. Therefore, there are incentives
for market makers to participate in a communiction game with other
dealers so that the opening bid and ask prices reect all available infor-
mation. As described by Farrell (1995), a central insight from the theory
of communication games is that a receiver of a signal changes his actions
in a way that is both to his benet and to that of the sender. Since deal-
ers mutually benet by an opening that reects all available information,
one would expect that the market will open at or near the equilibrium
price, if a communiction game takes place during the pre-opening and
functions properly.
To better understand the role played by the pre-opening we need
to further elaborate on one last attribute of the Nasdaq national mar-
ket. Nasdaq rule 4613 prohibits market makers entering or maintaining
quotes during normal business hours that cause a locked or crossed mar-
6
ket without rst making a reasonable eort to avoid locking or crossing
the market.
10
However, this rule is not in eect during the pre-opening.
2 Description of the Data
Two intra-day data sets are used to conduct our empirical analysis. The
primary one is the Nasdaq pre-opening data set. The source of the data
is the Bridge Information Services. The data was down-loaded by sav-
ing screens of real-time quotes for the pre-opening period from 8:00 to
9:30 a.m.
11
The sample period extends from October 1, 1995 through
September 30, 1996. The pre-opening data set contains (1) individual
market maker quotes and the identity of the originating market maker
who enters the quotes, and (2) the market quotes (i.e., the best bid-
ask prices), which is updated when the best individual market maker
quotes (either the bid, the ask, or both) change. Both quotes are time
stamped to the minute and are recorded in chronological sequence within
a minute. The individual market maker quotes provide valuable infor-
mation that allows us to infer which market maker contributes to the
change in the market quotes.
The second data set consists of all trades and quotes for our sample
stocks that exist on the TAQ database. Several standard lters were
used to screen the data. First, trades and quotes agged as errors,
non-standard delivery trades, and non-rm quotations were excluded.
Second, we excluded all quotes originating in markets other than Nas-
daq because regional quotes tend to closely follow the quotes posted
by market makers on the primary market. Finally, quotes with obvi-
ous recording errors were discarded. In the TAQ database, the market
quotes are time-stamped to the nearest second and updated when the
best individual market maker quotes change. While the market quotes
are available for both pre-opening and trading periods from the TAQ
database, the individual market maker quotes are not available.
Our sample consists of 50 of the most active Nasdaq stocks, as mea-
sured by 1994 share volume. These stocks are also among the largest
on Nasdaq as there is a high correlation between trading activity and
market capitalization. Hence, our analysis includes all the major Nasdaq
10
A crossed market is a market where the best bid price equals the best asked
price. A locked market is one where the best bid price exceeds the best ask price. For
simplicity, this paper refers to both locked and crossed markets as locked markets.
11
Since the focus of the paper is the price discovery during the pre-opening period,
we did not down-load individual market maker quotes entered into the system during
trading hours.
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stocks such as Apple, Microsoft, Intel, Cisco Systems, Biogen and sev-
eral others. As ve stocks switched to other markets or were otherwise
de-listed from Nasdaq during the sample period, additional stocks were
added in order of 1994's share volume to maintain a total sample size of
50. Three stocks with less than 60 trading days available are excluded.
Thus, the nal sample includes 52 stocks which are listed in Table 1.
The table also shows that most stocks have about 252 trading days dur-
ing the sample period. The average market value of the stock is $6,574
million.
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Table 2 presents characteristics of the sample stocks during pre-
opening and during trading hours. For the pre-opening period, the stock
with the most market makers (84 market makers) is Novell, while the one
with the least is Willamette Industries (21 market makers). On average,
22 market makers participate in the pre-opening communication for a
stock. The daily average number of pre-opening market maker quotes is
47. The number of market quotes per hour during the pre-opening aver-
ages 3.3. The average number of market quotes per hour is 11.0 during
the trading hours, which is about three times as much as that during
the pre-opening period. For the trading period, the average number of
trades is 1294 trades per day, and the daily average share (dollar) volume
is 1.88 million shares (82 million dollars).
The stocks appearing in Table 2 are partitioned into four quartiles
according to their trading frequency, which is measured by the daily
average number of trades. Quartile 1 consists of the least active stocks
with less than 416 trades per day, while quartile 4 contains the most
active stocks with more than 1,712 trades per day. We note from Table
2 that there is a strong monotonically increasing pattern between trading
frequency and the daily averages for number of market makers (13, 18,
24 and 32), number of pre-opening market maker quotes (20, 33, 52 and
84) , and number of market quotes per hour during the pre-opening (2.0,
2.4, 3.8, and 4.9) and during trading hours (2.9, 7.3, 13.2, 20.6).
3 Characteristics of Nasdaq Pre-Opening
Prices
This section provides a rst look at the characteristics of Nasdaq pre-
opening quotes. In the rst subsection we describe in detail the peculiar
phenomenon of locked market quotes. Next we examine how overnight
12
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data set is used to obtain
market capitalization of sample stocks. Five securities in our sample are either foreign
stocks or ADR's, and the market value of these rms was unavailable from CRSP.
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returns are related to price quote activity during the pre-opening. The
nal subsection investigates the price contribution of the pre-opening to
the daily price changes. The statistical analysis is conned to the price
quote data and does not yet investigate the market maker identications.
Restricting our attention here only on the quotes during pre-opening is
done to reject the prior that the pre-opening is purely a noisy warming up
session. Evidence against this prior should be strong enough to be trans-
parent through summary statistics involving price quotes only. In the
next section we will examine the pre-opening individual market maker
quotes and demonstrate the role of leadership among market makers in
the price discovery process.
3.1 Locked Market Quotes
In the absence of trading, we adopt a prior from the prevailing literature
and do not expect that prices during the pre-opening mimic the behavior
during regular trading as private information will not be revealed. It
may be further argued that pre-opening sessions are pure noise because
all the posted quotes are void of any commitment. In this section, we
rst establish empirical regularities of the market quotes during the pre-
opening, and identify important features of the pre-opening prices which
are dierent from those during the trading hours. We then nd evidence
that pre-opening quotes contain information even though they are non-
binding commitments.
Since the locked market quotes and locked sequences are important
characteristics of pre-opening prices, and are therefore the focus of our
empirical investigation, we provide rst their formal denitions:
 Locked market quote: is dened as a market quote where the
best bid is higher than or equal to the best ask. The market quote
is the best bid-ask prices among all dealers. We will frequently
refer to locked market quotes simply as locks for brevity.
 Locked sequence: is dened as a continuous series of locked
market quotes. A locked sequence begins with the last unlocked
market quote prior to the sequence and ends with the rst unlocked
market quote after the sequence. Whenever a lock is widened it is
considered as the start of a new lock sequence.
Table 3 presents summary statistics of market quotes during the pre-
opening and trading hours. As shown in Panel A, which is organized by
time of the day, a large fraction of the market quotes (34.9%) is locked
during the pre-opening. In the rst ve minutes following the market
9
opens, the frequency of the locked market quotes drops to 4.2%, and then
drops to virtually zero during the rest of the trading day. On average,
the frequency of the locked market quotes during trading hours is only
0.3%, which is negligible. In addition to the dierence in the frequency
of locks, there is also a signicant dierence in the size of locks between
pre-opening and trading hours. During the pre-opening, the average
magnitude of locks is $0.48. The size of locks is generally below $0.10
during morning trading hours, and below $0.03 in the afternoon. The
average duration of locked market sequences suggests that most of the
locked market sequences initiated during the pre-opening are unlocked by
the end of the rst ve minutes of the trading session. After this, a lock is
usually unlocked quickly. These results indicate that pre-opening quotes
are fundamentally dierent from those of trading hours in that the best
(individual market maker) bid price often exceeds the best (individual
market maker) ask price. Locking the market during trading hours, even
during the time when the market is extremely volatile, is discouraged
by Nasdaq, and the locked market quotes during trading hours are often
considered not to be sustainable.
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Why do Nasdaq dealers lock the market so frequently during the pre-
opening? Are these locks associated with the overnight information ow
and therefore contain information? Before answering these questions
formally it will be useful to present some illustrative plots of locked
market conditions during the pre-opening.
Figures 1 and 2 represent two examples chosen to highlight salient
features of the incidence of locks during the pre-opening. Most stocks
in our sample exhibit a mixture of these features including (1) the pre-
opening prices converge to the opening price gradually, with a single
market maker dominating a change in the stock price, and (2) the pre-
opening prices converge to the opening prices, but with overshooting at
the beginning of the pre-opening.
In Figure 1, we display the bid-ask and the midpoint of individual
market maker quotes as well as the best bid-ask quotes during the pre-
opening for Microsoft (MSFT) on December 8, 1995. On the previous
trading day, December 7, Microsoft had closed at $90
5
8
- $90
3
4
. On the
8th, the stock would rise to $94
1
8
- $94
5
8
. At 8:22 a.m., the Nasdaq
computers recorded the initial best bid-ask quote of the day, repeating
the previous day's close quote of $90
5
8
- $90
3
4
. Seventeen minutes later,
Morgan Stanley & Co. posted the rst market maker quote of the day,
13
During trading hours, the market makers who lock the market often get phone
calls from Nasdaq ocials to resolve the lock quickly. Under rule 4613, the mar-
ket makers are also obligated to trade at their locked prices and consequently risk
monetary loss should they lock a market.
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locking the market and raising the best bid $
1
4
to $90
7
8
. Within the
next minute, Bear, Stearns & Co. raised the best bid another $
1
8
. Eight
minutes later Weeden & Co. raised the best bid by $
1
8
to $91
1
8
, and
Morgan Stanley & Co. raised the bid by $
3
8
. Microsoft, with a market
capitalization of $51 billion, was up $
7
8
31 minutes after the Nasdaq
system came on. At this point 7 dierent market makers had entered
their quotes into the system. In the 37 minutes left in the pre-opening,
the best bid would rise four more times in establishing the opening bid
of $92
1
2
. Overall, Morgan Stanley would increase the best bid quote 3
times and account for $
7
8
of the $1
7
8
increase during the pre-opening.
The opening best bid-ask quote of $92
1
2
- $92
5
8
appears to have been a
reasonable estimate of the equilibrium price as the 11 a.m. trade prices
were in the range $92
3
4
- $93
1
4
. Through a series of quote changes,
Nasdaq market makers had established a new equilibrium price with
which to start the trading day. This plot is selected as a typical example
of a single market maker dominating a change in the price level of a
stock with a series of quotes that alter the best bid-ask spread. Morgan
Stanley is identied as the dominating market maker who initiated and
reinforced the lock.
Figure 2 presents the pre-opening quote behavior of Chiron Corp.
(CHIR) on August 1, 1996. On the previous trading day, the stock closed
at $21
7
8
- $22. At 8:24 a.m., Hambrecht and Quist initiated the rst lock
of the day and lowered the best ask price by $2. Subsequent quotes by
other market makers reversed some of the $2 price decline and the stock
opened down $1
1
4
. This example shows that the movement of the best
bid-ask quote during the pre-opening is not a steady convergence to the
opening price as was the case for Microsoft on December 8, 1995. For
Chiron, the direction of the overnight price change is consistent with the
assessment of Hambrecht and Quist who initiated the lock. However,
their prediction of the magnitude of the price change is larger than that
of other market makers. The market makers' later quotes reected a less
pessimistic outlook for the stock and that assessment was transmitted
to the market. This example demonstrates that locked market quotes
contain valuable information about the subsequent opening price, and
that they signal other market makers what the opening price should be.
Yet, these signals are not perfect and contain noise.
To appreciate the information content of the pre-opening prices and
to understand how Nasdaq market makers use these prices to reveal and
share information, we examine the association between the pre-opening
locked market quotes and two measures of overnight information ow.
We use the absolute value of price changes as a measure of informa-
tion ow following Bessembinder, Chan and Sequin (1996). In Panel B
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the overnight information ow is measured as the absolute value of the
close-to-open price change which is denoted by (jP
ov
j). Arguably this
measure may be biased towards nding some spurious association be-
tween pre-opening quote activity and jP
ov
j since the last pre-opening
quote should straddle the opening price. To avoid potential endogeneity
problems, we replace the absolute value of close-to-open price change by
the absolute value of close-to-close price change (jP
cc
j), and repeat the
above exercise. These results are reported in Panel C of Table 3.
Panel B of Table 3 presents summary statistics of locked market
quotes during the pre-opening, with the results being partitioned by
jP
ov
j. Clearly, the frequency of the locked market quotes monotoni-
cally increase with the absolute value of the overnight return. For ex-
ample, when jP
ov
j 2 $0{
1
8
, the frequency of locks is 8.2%, whereas for
jP
ov
j 2 $2{5 range the frequency of locks increases substantially to
81.8%. The average size of locks ( bid price less the ask price) also in-
creases monotonically with the absolute value of overnight price changes.
When jP
ov
j is small, the magnitude of locks is only $0.15. However,
when jP
ov
j is large (say, between $2 and $5), the size of corresponding
locks is also large ($1.38). Finally, the duration of locks, as measured by
minutes or number of market quotes, show similar patterns: the larger
the absolute value of the overnight price change, the longer the duration
of locks. Given that the absolute value of overnight price changes is of-
ten used as proxy for overnight information ows, or overnight volatility
of the price change, the reported evidence suggests that locked mar-
ket quotes are informative and bear a relation with the accumulated
overnight information ow. The results in Panel C are consistent with
the ndings in the Panel B. Again, the frequency of locked market quotes,
the size of locks and their durations all increase monotonically with the
absolute value of the close-to-close price change. For example, the size
of the lock is $$0.20 when jP
cc
j 2 $0 
1
8
. It increases to $0.70 when
the overnight return is between $2 and $5. These results, together with
those in Panel B, suggest that locked market quotes occurring during
the pre-opening are associated with the overnight information ow and
are informative.
We conclude this section with Panel D of Table 3. It reports sum-
mary statistics by trading frequency. The 52 sample stocks are parti-
tioned into four equal-size subsamples according to daily average number
of trades. It is noted that the frequency of locks during the pre-opening
increases while the duration of locks decreases with trading frequency.
For the least active stocks, the frequency of locked market quotes is
20.2%, while the average duration is 29.8 minutes. For the most active
stocks, the frequency of locks increases to 52.5%, but the average dura-
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tion decreases to 14.2 minutes. We expect that active stocks feature more
often overnight information arrival, which often may lead to a greater
dispersion of opinion about the fundamental value of the stock among
individual market makers. Hence, one would expect that, active stocks
have more market locks during the pre-opening. On the other hand, for
the active stocks, more market makers participate in the pre-opening.
This might explain why the information uncertainty about active stocks
is resolved more quickly, and why the average duration of market locks
is shorter for active stocks.
3.2 Regression Analysis of Market Locks
To further our understanding of locked market quotes during the pre-
opening, we rely on regression models to study the association between
the size of locks (or the duration) and the proxies of the overnight infor-
mation arrival. A rst set of three regressions involves jP
ov
j. Speci-
cally, we estimate the following three regressions:
jP
ov
t
j = + LockSize
t
+ 
t
; (1)
jP
ov
t
j = + LockT ime
t
+ 
t
; (2)
jP
ov
t
j = + LockQuote
t
+ 
t
; (3)
where jP
ov
j is the absolute value of the overnight (close-to-open) price
change, LockSize is the size (bid price less the ask price) of the locked
market quote, expressed in cents, LockT ime is the duration of the locked
market sequence in minutes, and LockQuote is the duration of the locked
market sequence in market quotes. The regressions are based on pooled
data involving all the stocks together.
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The rst three columns of Table 4 display the results for the three
regression models (1) through (3). The results show that jP
ov
j is sig-
nicantly and positively related to the size of the locks as well as their
duration. Based on the coecient estimate of 0.88, the absolute value
of the overnight price change will be 11 cents larger when the lock size
increases by $
1
8
. Moreover, the regression results also suggest that the
absolute value of the overnight price change will increase by about 10.2
cents when the duration of a lock increases by 10 minutes. One notice-
able result is that, although both the size of locks and their duration are
signicantly related to jP
ov
j, the explanatory power provided by the
size of locks is much larger. The adjusted R
2
s are 0.13 and 0.03, respec-
tively, when the size and the duration are used as independent variables.
14
For each stock on a given day, observations are stacked together when there are
multiple locks.
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Using the alternative denition of lock duration in terms of number of
market quotes leads to similar results. We also consider the absolute
value of the close-to-close price change (jP
cc
j) as the dependent vari-
able in the regression. The results are reported in the next panel of three
columns in Table 4. Clearly, these regressions are qualitatively similar to
those based on jP
ov
j, with the estimated coecient  slightly smaller.
The last two regression models examine the relationship between the
size and duration of locks:
LockT ime
t
= + LockSize
t
+ 
t
; (4)
LockQuote
t
= + LockSize
t
+ 
t
: (5)
The null hypothesis is that LockSize has no relationship with the length
of the lock. If locks are not informative, we should expect that the mag-
nitude of the lock and the duration are unrelated. If  is signicantly
dierent from zero and of positive sign then large size locks during the
pre-opening take a longer time to unlock. In terms of economic interpre-
tation such an empirical result would suggest that more information un-
certainty and more dispersion of opinion about the opening price among
market makers as reected by larger LockSize results in longer coordi-
nation spells. The results appearing in the last two columns of Table 4
show that the estimated  coecients are positive and signicant, re-
gardless of whether the duration of the lock is measured in minutes or in
number of market quotes. The coecient of  is 12.02 when LockT ime
is regressed on LockSize. Therefore, the duration of a lock is about 1.5
minutes longer for an $
1
8
increase in the size of the lock. The results
based on LockT ime are slightly stronger in terms of adjusted R
2
than
those of LockQuote.
3.3 The Contribution of the Pre-Opening to the Daily
Price Change
Having demonstrated that pre-opening prices and locked market quotes
reect overnight information, we now address two related questions: how
large is the contribution of the pre-opening period towards daily stock
price changes, and how large is the contribution of locked periods? Sub-
stantial price contributions from the pre-opening and from periods when
the markets are locked would indicate that the pre-opening and locked
markets are an important component of the price discovery process. To
answer these questions, we consider two alternative approaches to quan-
tify the contribution of each time period.
For any given day, we partition the pre-opening and trading hours
14
into four sub-periods. Let i denote a particular period, and i 2 (pre-
lock, lock, post-lock, trading period). The rst three sub-periods cover
the pre-opening period, which is from 8:00 to 9:30 a.m. The pre-lock
period is from 8:00 a.m. until the quote prior to the start of the rst
locked market sequence. The lock period spans from the quote prior to
the occurrence of a locked market sequence until the rst subsequent
non-locked market quote or until 9:30 a.m. The post-lock period starts
when the last locked market is unlocked until 9:30 a.m., plus the time
period in-between any two locked periods (if there are multiple lock
periods). If there are no locks, the entire pre-opening is dened to be
part of the pre-lock period. The trading period is from 9:30 a.m. until
4:00 p.m.
The measures of price contribution we use are inspired by the anal-
ysis of Barclay and Warner (1993). The rst measure uses the absolute
value of the cumulative daily price change as the weight. Specically,
for each stock and for a given period i 2 (pre-lock, lock, post-lock, trad-
ing period), we calculate the fraction of the price change over period i
relative to close-to-close price change on each day. Next, we weight each
day's contribution of period i based on that day's contribution to the
cumulative absolute price change over the entire sample period. The
weighted price contribution (WPC) of period i to daily price change is
determined as:
WPC
i
=
T
X
t=1
 
jP
t
j
P
T
t=1
jP
t
j
!


P
i;t
P
t

(6)
where P
i;t
is the total price change for period i on day t and P
t
is
the price change for day t (e.g., from day t   1 close to day t close).
The rst term in parentheses is the weighting factor for each day, while
the second term in parentheses is the relative contribution of the price
change for period i on day t to the price change on day t. As noted by
Barclay and Warner (1993), this measure serves the purpose of reducing
the heteroskedasticity in the observations since the relative rather than
absolute price contributions of each day t are used.
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Table 5 presents the cross-sectional average of the contribution of
each time period to the daily price change. The results are reported for
each sub-period for the full sample and for each of the trade frequency
15
To justify the weighting scheme, consider the situation where the price change
during the pre-opening is +7/8 and the price change during the trading hours is
-3/4. Hence, the daily price change is 1/8. Without weighting, the percentage of
pre-opening contribution is 700%. The weighting scheme down-weights observations
when the absolute value of daily price change is small. It is also worth observing that
the measure avoids the pitfalls of zero price change.
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quartiles. On average, 16.5% of the daily price change is attributable to
the pre-opening period, and the remaining 83.5% to the trading period.
Within the pre-opening period, the contribution of the pre-lock, lock,
and post-lock periods are 5.9%, 10.1%, and 0.5%, respectively. There-
fore, 61.2% of the pre-opening price change occurred during market locks.
It suggests that locking the market is an important part of the price dis-
covery process, and that locked market quotes contain information about
future price changes. The results for each trading frequency quartile re-
veal that the contribution of the lock period increases with the trading
frequency. For the least active stocks, for example, the locked period
and pre-opening period accounted for 7.7% and 16.9% of the daily price
change. While for the most active stocks, these fractions are 14.8% and
20.4%, respectively. Therefore, the contribution of locked market quotes
to either daily price change or the price change during the pre-opening
period is much larger for active stocks than for inactive stocks. These
results are consistent with our earlier ndings that pre-opening prices are
informative about the future prices, and that locking the market quotes
is an important mechanism to discover the equilibrium opening price.
Although the above measure of the contribution of each time pe-
riod towards the daily price change is informative, it does not take into
account the fact that the pre-opening period is much shorter than the
trading period (one and half hours versus six and half hours), and that
locked periods are much shorter than the pre-opening period. Viewed
from this perspective, both the contribution of the pre-opening period
to daily price change and the contribution of the lock period to the price
change during the pre-opening are, to a certain degree, under-estimated.
To take the time length of each sub-period into account, we re-scale the
weighted contribution of the pre-opening period by 1.25 hours and of the
trading period by 6.5 hours. Moreover, within the pre-opening period,
we modify the measure given in (6) by including the time length of each
period in the weight. Using the time weighted price change during the
trading period as a benchmark, the relative time weighted price contri-
bution (RTWPC) for each sub-period i 2 (pre-open, pre-lock, lock, or
post-lock) is determined as:
RTWPC
i
=
WPC
i
=
P
T
t=1
Time
i;t
WPC
trading
=
P
T
t=1
Time
trading;t
: (7)
With this renement, the results will show the contribution of each pe-
riod towards daily price change per unit of time relative to that of the
trading period. The results presented in Table 5 show that the price
contribution per unit time during the pre-opening is slightly larger than
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that during the trading period, namely the ratio is 1.1. In comparison
to the contribution of trading periods, the contribution of the locked
periods is larger by a factor of 3.5 (or 350%), and the contribution of
post-lock periods is larger by a factor of 1.6 (160%). In contrast, the
contribution of pre-lock period is only 60% of that of the trading pe-
riod. These results demonstrate that the pre-opening period, especially
the locks, contribute signicantly to the daily price change, even though
there is no trading during the pre-opening.
3.4 A First Look at Individual Stocks and Market
Makers
The regression results reported in this section so far pertained to all
stocks together. We nd that locked market quotes are related to the
overnight information ow. We explore this further now with individual
market maker data. Table 6 reports, for each stock, the number of locked
market quotes, the frequency of locks relative to total number of market
quotes, the number of locked sequences during the entire sample period,
and the identity (ID) of the market maker responsible for the largest
contribution to the price change during locked sequences.
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All statistics
are calculated using information exclusively from the pre-opening period.
The results are reported according to trading frequency quartiles. It is
seen that each of the variables monotonically increases with the trading
frequency. Starting with the number of locked market quotes we observe
in Table 6 that in the least active quartile, the number of locks ranges
from 8 to 75 (with RTRSY being the only exception). In contrast, the
number of locks varies from 152 to 1308 for stocks in the most active
quartile. The median number of locks for each quartile are 33, 106, 267
and 703, respectively. In relative terms, the average frequency of the
locked market quotes are 11.2%, 14.3%, 31.1% and 49.9%, respectively
for each quartile. In addition, the average number of locked sequences
increases from 59 for least active stocks (quartile 1) to 410 for most
active stocks (quartile 4). These results further demonstrate that locks
primarily occur for actively traded stocks.
The last column of Table 6 reports the identity of the market maker
who is responsible for the largest price contribution during locked se-
quences for a given stock. Interestingly, among more than 200 Nasdaq
dealers, a few of them stand out as the leading market maker. For exam-
ple, among the 52 sample stocks, Bear, Stearns (with market maker ID
16
Details about the calculations of price contributions for individual market makers
will be discussed in section 5.
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BEST) is the number one leading market maker for 7 stocks, and Morgan
Stanley (with market maker ID MSCO) is the number one leading mar-
ket maker for another 7 stocks. These results raise the question whether
there is a leadership pattern among individual market makers who make
the market in the same stocks, an issue raised by Chan, Christie and
Schultz (1995). We will discuss this issue in Section 5. Before we inves-
tigate leadership behavior we examine the temporal dynamics of quote
behavior during the pre-opening.
4 Quote Behavior with and without Trad-
ing
We have examined the characteristics of pre-opening prices and shown
that they do contain information about the opening prices and future
prices. This section turns to the analysis of the temporal dynamics of
market quotes with and without trading. The interest here is to see what
dierences exist in the interactions between quote arrivals and market
volatility in market mechanisms with and without binding quotes. In the
rst subsection we study the contemporaneous relationship between in-
novations in volatility and quote arrivals. The second subsection explores
Granger causality between innovations in volatility and quote arrivals.
4.1 The Contemporaneous Relationship between In-
novations in Volatility and Quote Arrivals
The tests used in this subsection require the construction of return se-
ries. Each day, for both the pre-opening and trading periods, returns
are constructed on a 15-minute interval basis using the market quotes
outstanding at the end of each interval.
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Every interval is classied as
either a no trade and no lock or a no trade and lock interval during the
pre-opening period from 8:00 to 9:30 a.m. A no trade and lock interval
is one during which a locked market quote occurred or that contains
part of a lock market sequence. During trading hours, all intervals are
classied as trade intervals. For each stock, 15-minute return observa-
tions are stacked together to obtain a time series of returns over the
entire sample period. The volatility of the return during the 15-minute
interval is dened as the absolute value of the 15-minute return, and
the quote arrivals as the number of market quotes during the interval.
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We also performed the analysis based on the 5-minute interval, and found the
results are similar. The results are available upon request.
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To obtain the innovation in volatility, we pre-whiten the volatility time
series using an AR(5) process augmented with three daily lags.
18
With
a similar lter, we obtain the time series of the innovations in quote
arrivals. It is important to note that the pre-whitening is done over the
entire sample covering the observations of the pre-opening as well as the
regular trading session.
The purpose of our tests is to see whether the binding nature of
the quote has any impact on the relationship between return volatility
and quote arrival. The return series during the pre-opening are based on
non-binding quotes whereas those during regular trading hours are based
on binding quotes. Before examining the contemporaneous relationship
between volatility and quote arrivals during the dierent market regimes,
we report some summary statistics in Panel A of Table 7. The means
of both series are zero by construction since the pre-whitening removes
the overall mean. The standard deviation of quote arrival is larger than
the standard deviation of volatility (in parentheses), 0.422 and 1.790,
respectively. When we partition the results using the classication of the
15-minute interval, the means of the innovation in volatility are -0.039,
0.343 and -0.004 for each of the three distinct classications. Hence, the
innovation in volatility is much larger during a no trade and lock period
than during a no trade and no lock period or a trade period. Similar
conclusions can be drawn from the innovations in quote arrival: there
is a much larger innovation in the quote arrival during a no trade and
lock period than during other times. These gures tell us that locked
market quotes display an unusual surprise in volatility eect and atypical
quote arrivals.
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To gauge the contemporaneous relationship between
innovations in volatility and quote arrivals, we consider the regression
model:

V
t
= 
NT;NL
I
NT;NL
t
+ 
NT;NL
I
NT;NL
t

Q
t
+ 
NT;L
I
NT;L
t
+
NT;L
I
NT;L
t

Q
t
+ 
T
I
T
t
+ 
T
I
T
t

Q
t
+ 
t
; (8)
where 
V
is the innovation in volatility, 
Q
is the innovation in quote
arrivals, I
NT;NL
is a dummy variable for no trade and no lock, I
NT;L
is
a dummy variable for no trade and lock, and I
T
is a dummy variable for
trade.
20
We estimate the regression model for each stock in the sample
18
The appropriate choice of AR lags is based on a model selection procedure using
signicant t-statistics as a guidance for lag selection.
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Recall that the dependent variable is pre-whitened over the complete sample
across all three market regimes and therefore is mean zero by construction. Since the
trading period covers the majority of sample data it is not surprising that the trade
subsample mean is close to zero as well.
20
To facilitate interpretation, we us superscripts for each coecient to indicate the
19
and obtain robust standard errors using the Newey-West method. The
cross-sectional average and standard error (in parentheses) of coecient
estimates, and number of signicant coecients at the 5% level among
52 stocks are reported in Panel B of Table 7. Of the three level eects

NT;NL
; 
NT;L
; and 
T
, the dummy variable of the no trade and lock
period has the largest impact on 
V
t
. The level eect of the trade period
is small and negligible.
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Of greater interest are the slope coecients 
NT;NL
; 
NT;L
and 
T
.
The point estimates suggest that, for each unit increase in the innovation
in quote arrival, the increase in the innovation in volatility will be 0.048
(
NT;NL
), 0.096 (
NT;L
) and 0.201 (
T
), and the number of signicant
coecients at 5% (among 52 stocks) are 51, 42 and 52, respectively.
The rst hypothesis of interest is whether the pre-opening period (or
the lock period) does not contribute to the innovation in volatility. Un-
der this null hypothesis, the coecients 
NT;NL
; 
NT;NL
; 
NT;L
, 
NT;L
,

NT;NL
and 
NT;L
are expected to be zero. The results show that this
hypothesis is strongly rejected. This evidence is consistent with results
reported in the previous section that non-binding pre-opening prices con-
tain information. The second hypothesis concerns whether the ow of
quotes has a greater impact during locks compared to the rest of the pre-
opening. This hypothesis can be formulated as H
0
: 
NT;NL
= 
NT;L
and H
a
: 
NT;NL
< 
NT;L
. In the lower part of Panel B it is reported
that the number of rejections is 40. Hence, the volatility response to
quote ow is higher during the pre-opening when the market is locked.
The nal hypothesis tests for dierential sensitivity of the innovation in
volatility with respect to the innovation in quote arrival between a no
trade and lock interval and a trade interval: H
0
: 
NT;L
= 
T
versus
H
a
: 
NT;L
< 
T
. The null hypothesis is rejected for 42 of the 52 rms
in our sample. Hence, it is clear that the innovations in quote arrival
during a trading interval has a much larger impact on volatility com-
pared to locked market regimes in the pre-opening. The conclusions we
ought to draw for the moment is that the pre-opening is neither real
trading, nor pure noise. So, what are the dynamics at play?
nature of the time interval.
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Though not reported in Table 7 we tested H
0
: 
NT;NL
= 
NT;L
and H
a
:

NT;NL
< 
NT;L
, and found that the number of rejections is 40 among 52 rms.
Likewise, we tested H
0
: 
NT;L
= 
T
and H
a
: 
NT;L
< 
T
, and found that the
number of rejections is 45 among 52 rms.
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4.2 Tests of Granger Causality between Volatility
and Order Flow
The preceding subsection has investigated the contemporaneous rela-
tionship between the innovation in volatility and quote arrivals during
three distinct time periods. In this subsection, we examine the dynamic
interaction between the two series via time series methods. The usual ap-
proach is to look at impulse response functions of Vector Autoregressive
representations or techniques closely related to that. Impulse response
analysis and Granger (1969) causality tests are related but serve dierent
purposes as discussed by Sims (1980). We focus here on formal tests of
Granger causality to compare the dierent market regimes. Specically,
we test for Granger causality between the innovations in volatility and
quote arrival and vice versa. In particular we will study: the Granger
causality from quote arrival to volatility, and the Granger causality from
volatility to quote arrivals.
The idea of Granger causality is to see whether past quote arrivals
can improve univariate predictions of price volatility where univariate
predictions only use the own past of a series. If there is predictive power
in past quotes then it is said that quotes Granger cause current volatility.
The converse can also be true and can be tested by running a regression
of past volatility onto current quote arrivals. If we nd Granger causality
only in one direction, then we call this uni-directional Granger causality.
As we are interested in conducting Granger causality tests in each of
the three market regimes, we use the following regression equations to
conduct the tests:
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and
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; (10)
where we use the same notation as in the previous subsection.
Recall that we perform Granger causality tests on pre-whitened se-
ries, that is series tted rst with a univariate time series model. How-
ever, the pre-whitening pertains to the entire sample across the three
market regimes. We know from the Panel A of Table 7 that there are
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dierences across the three regimes. Therefore we need to include lagged
dependent variables associated with each market regime despite the pre-
whitening. The coecients which are the most important in these re-
gressions are 
NT;NL
, 
NT;L
and 
T
: Again, we estimate the regression
model and use corrected standard errors and variance-covariance matrix
for hypothesis testing.
Let us rst consider Granger causality from quotes to volatility in
Panel A of Table 8. The null of the joint test H
0
: 
NT;NL
= 
NT;L
=

T
= 0 is rejected for 19 stocks among 52. The signicance of individual
coecients shows similar features. Hence, regardless of trading or pre-
opening market conditions, there appears to be some information in the
previous 15 minute quote arrivals that predict surprises in volatility. The
results indicate a negative relationship between quote arrivals and future
volatility regardless of the regime. It is interesting to note that 
NT;NL
and 
T
are both roughly equal whereas 
NT;L
is more than three times
larger. Hence, quote arrivals during locks have a much larger impact on
subsequent price volatility.
Panel B of Table 8 shows very strong evidence that past innova-
tions in volatility Granger causes innovations in quote arrivals. The null
H
0
: 
NT;NL
= 
NT;L
= 
T
= 0 is overwhelmingly rejected. Most im-
portantly, it is clear that the rejection comes from the trading period
as 
NT;NL
, and to a lesser extent 
NT;L
; are barely signicant. More-
over, we observe that 
T
is not only highly signicant but also positive
while 
NT;L
is negative and implies a steep slope in comparison to 
T
.
This nding shows signicant dierences in quote/volatility dynamics
between a trading period and a locked period. This dierence should be
attributed to Nasdaq rule 4613 against locked markets during trading.
When a volatility shock occurs during a trading period, market makers
must not change their price in a way that would lock the markets. Con-
sequently, the best bid-ask quote must be walked up or down through
successive rounds of quotes as market makers adjust to the new infor-
mation. There will be a series of new market quotes reecting $
1
16
to
1
8
changes in the best bid-ask spread following the shock. As the market
quotes adjust at the pace of the slowest market maker, the impact of
the volatility shock aects quote arrivals positively in the subsequent
interval because of the slow adjustment pace. In contrast, during the
pre-opening period market locks are a fast price adjustment which ex-
plains the immediate slowdown in quote arrivals subsequent to volatility.
These results emphasize the very distinct quote/volatility dynamics as-
sociated with market locks during the pre-opening.
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5 Is there Leadership among Market Mak-
ers?
It is clear that while price quotes during the pre-opening have an in-
formational content they respond and aect quote behavior dierently
compared to the regular trading hours on the Nasdaq. So, what is the
logic behind the quote dynamics? We found that during the pre-opening,
Nasdaq market makers often use a distinct mechanism (i.e., to lock the
market quotes) to indicate to others what the opening prices should be
and which direction the price should move. Since many market mak-
ers participate in the pre-opening and hundreds of quotes ash across
screens we know that market locks are a way to signal a willingness to
change the price quotes. Therefore, one may wonder whether any par-
ticular market maker or small group of market makers take a leading
role in sending credible signals to others when they possess valuable in-
formation. Finding such a leadership pattern would strongly reinforce
the fact that a coordination game takes place during the pre-opening. In
this section, we address two related questions. First, who are the market
makers who lock the market most frequently? Second, are there leaders
among market makers in a given stock. In other words, does each market
maker contribute equally to the price discovery during the pre-opening?
Answers to these questions will provide additional insight into the price
discovery process during the pre-opening.
5.1 Does Each Market Maker Contribute Equally to
the Lock?
Multiple locked market quotes can occur during the pre-opening on a
given day. However, some locked market quotes are triggered by new in-
formation, and some locks are simply part of the processes of unlocking
the market during a locked market sequence. We start by identifying
market makers who initiate the locked sequence as these quotes pro-
vide new information. To determine the distribution of locked sequence
initiation for each sample stock, we calculate the frequency of locked se-
quences attributed to each market maker, and then, test for the uniform
distribution of locked sequences across all market makers.
The three market makers responsible for initiating the greatest frac-
tion of the locked sequences for each stock initiate an aggregate of about
40% of the total locked sequences during the pre-opening. In contrast,
they contribute an aggregate of approximately 9% of the pre-opening
quotes. Using a 
2
test, we nd the null hypothesis that each mar-
23
ket maker initiates the lock sequences with equal probability is strongly
rejected. We also strongly reject the null that the distribution of ini-
tiation of locked sequences is the same as the distribution of market
maker quotes.
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Overall, these results suggest that there exist dierent
patterns of behavior in terms of lock initiation across market makers.
The rejections of the distributional tests are so strong as to warrant
further analysis. In order to uncover potential leadership among market
makers, it is important to identify market makers who make signicant
contribution to the price change during lock periods, as their quotes
provide new information to the market. To gauge the contribution of
each market maker during locks, we use a measure similar to the weighted
price contribution in equation (6). Specically, for a given stock, the
weighted price contribution during locks (WPCL) by market maker k is
dened as:
WPCL
k
=
T
X
t=1
 
j
P
N
t
j=1
P
j;t
j
P
T
t=1
j
P
N
t
j=1
P
j;t
j
!

 
P
N
t
j=1
P
j;t
I
j;k
P
N
t
j=1
P
j;t
!
;(11)
where P
j;t
is the price change during jth lock on day t, N
t
is the
number of locks on day t, and I
j;k
is a dummy variable with value 1 if
the jth lock is initiated by market maker k and with value 0 otherwise.
The rst term in parentheses is the weighting factor for each day. Each
day's weight is determined by that day's contribution to the cumulative
absolute daily price change across all locks over the entire sample period.
The second term in parentheses is the contribution of the price change
during locks initiated by market maker k on day t relative to total price
change across all locks on day t.
For each stock, Table 9 presents the Nasdaq market maker ID for
the three market makers who contribute the most to the price change
during locks (The full name of these market makers will appear in Ta-
ble 10 shortly). We dene these three market makers as leading mar-
ket makers.
23
The results are sorted and reported according to trading
frequency quartiles. The top three market makers are credited with a
signicant proportion of the price contribution. For example, the cross-
sectional average of the price contribution of the number one, two and
three leading market makers during locks are 24.3%, 14.0% and 10.6%,
respectively, and their contribution constitutes 49.0% of the total price
change in aggregate during locks.
22
We relied both on 
2
goodness-of-t tests as well as sign tests to compare the
distribution of quotes and locked sequences across market makers.
23
Alternative denitions of leading market makers were also considered. Using a
relative measure, for example, dening leaders as those market makers who contribute
50% of the price change during locks, yielded similar results.
24
Table 9 also presents the locked-sequence frequency and the quote
frequency for each leading market maker identied with the measure of
the price contribution. On average, 13.7% of the locked sequences are
initiated by the number one market maker, 11.3% by the number two
market maker, and 9.7% by the number three market maker. In aggre-
gate, the leading market makers initiate about 35% of the total locked
sequences during the pre-opening. In contrast, the number one, two and
three market makers contribute 3.0%, 3.0% and 3.0% of pre-opening
quotes, respectively. Therefore, the dierence in the contribution to the
price discovery is apparent among the leading market makers, although
they quote prices with similar frequency.
If the pre-opening is used by market makers to exchange information
regarding the opening price then the leading market makers should be
those who are expected to possess signicant private information about
the security or order ow. To investigate this possibility we present the
ID of the leading market maker, its full name, and its occurrence as the
number one, two and three market maker for our sample stocks in Table
10. The results indicate that major brokerage rms often act as leading
market makers. For instance, Morgan Stanley & Co. (or Bear, Stearns
& Co.) is identied as the number one, two and three leading market
maker for 7, 6, and 5 stocks (or for 7, 5, and 5 stocks). The four large
brokerage rms, Morgan Stanley & Co., Bear, Stearns & Co., Goldman
Sachs & Co. and Merrill Lynch Inc. are identied as the leading number
one market maker for 20 stocks, among the 52 sample stocks. The same
four brokerage rms are also the second leading market maker in 19
stocks and they are ranked third for 16 stocks. Overall, these results
suggest that there exists leading market makers who contribute more
to the price discovery during the pre-opening than many other market
makers.
5.2 Regression Analysis of Overnight Return
Having demonstrated the presence of leadership among market makers,
we now turn to the analysis of the relationship between the overnight
return and the return during locked market sequences to further test
the role of leading market makers. Two specications are considered.
First, we examine the association between the overnight return and the
return of the locked period on days when there is at least one locked
sequence.
24
Second, we identify whether a locked sequence is associated
with a leader (i.e., one of the top three market makers who contribute the
24
In this exercise, days on which there are no locked sequences, which account for
about 30% of the total observations, are dropped from the analysis.
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most to the price change during locks) or with a non-leader, and separate
the lock-period return associated with leaders from those associated with
non-leaders. The estimated models are:
R
ov
t
= + 
1
R
Lock
t
+ 
t
; (12)
R
ov
t
= + 
2
R
Lock;Non Leaders
t
+ 
3
R
Lock;Leaders
t
+
4
R
PostLock
t
+ 
t
; (13)
where R
ov
is the overnight return, R
Lock
is the compounded return
for all locks occurring during the pre-opening, R
Lock;Non Leaders
is the
compounded return for all pre-opening locks that are associated with
non-leading market makers, R
Lock;Leaders
is the compounded return for
all pre-opening locks that are associated with leading market makers,
and R
PostLock
is the compounded return from the end of the last lock
until the open, and between any two consecutive locks if more than
one lock occurs. Under the null hypothesis that locks are uninforma-
tive, 
1
in equation (12) should be zero, H
0
: 
1
= 0: Furthermore,
there are three hypotheses to be tested using equation (13). The rst
hypothesis is that only locks initiated by leaders are informative (i.e.,
H
0
: 
2
= 0). Another interesting hypothesis is that there is no leader
eect and locks have the same explanatory power regardless of who ini-
tiates them: H
0
: 
2
= 
3
versus H
a
: 
2
< 
3
. The third hypothesis
concerns the explanatory power of the post-lock return. If locks are the
only informative feature of the pre-opening then 
4
is expected to be
zero, i.e. H
0
: 
4
= 0.
The test result, as reported in Table 11, is based on observations
pooled both over time and cross-sectionally for the entire sample and
for each trade-frequency quartile. For the full sample, the estimated
coecient of 
1
in equation (12) is 0.64 and signicant at 5%, and the
adjusted R
2
is 0.50. Thus, 50% of the overnight return is explained by the
return over locked periods, which is consistent with the result in Table
5. For equation (13), the coecient estimates of 
2
and 
3
are 0.67 and
0.78, and both are signicant at the 5% level. The null hypothesis that
only leaders matter (i.e., H
0
: 
2
= 0) is strongly rejected, suggesting
that both leaders and non-leaders contribute to the overnight return.
The second null hypothesis that the leader eect is the same as the
non-leader eect is strongly rejected at the 5% level, and the result
leads to the conclusion that the leader eect, 
3
, is larger than the non-
leader eect, 
2
. For the nal hypothesis concerning the explanatory
power of the post-lock return, the point estimate of 
4
is 1.47 and the
null hypothesis is rejected at 5%. Although the post-lock return has
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additional explanatory power, it increases the adjusted R
2
from 50% to
60%, its marginal contribution is smaller in comparison to the return
over locked periods.
The results for trading frequency quartiles exhibit several patterns.
The coecient estimate of 
2
decreases, while 
3
is relative stable with
respect to trading frequency. It is noted that the leader eect is sig-
nicantly larger than the non-leader eect for stocks in the most active
quartile. For stocks in trade-frequency quartiles 1, 2 and 3, the leader
and non-leader eects are statistically similar. The results of larger
leader eect for the entire sample mainly come from the most actively
traded stocks, which accounted for about 50% (1726 observations) of the
total observations (3543 observations).
In summary, the regression analysis reveals that returns over locked
periods explain a signicantly large portion (50% { 60%) of overnight
returns. In addition, locked sequences associated with leading market
makers have a larger impact on the overnight return than those associ-
ated with non-leading market makers.
6 Conclusion
We have studied the price discovery process on Nasdaq during the one-
and-half hours prior to the opening of trading. The Nasdaq pre-opening
has several characteristics: (1) many Nasdaq market makers participate
in the pre-opening communication game and actively quote prices, (2)
the pre-opening prices are non-binding commitments which can be re-
vised, and (3) the identity of participating market makers is known to
others. Hence, the pre-opening period provides an ideal setting to inves-
tigate (1) whether there is price discovery in the absence of trading and
binding commitments, (2) whether the price discovery during the pre-
opening is a signicant part of the daily price change, and (3) whether
the Nasdaq structure facilitates market makers' signal to each other to
share information and resolve the information uncertainty without actual
trading.
While it is a common belief that non-binding commitments do not
contain any information and do not contribute to price discovery, this
article shows that there is price discovery in the absence of rm com-
mitments and trading on Nasdaq. The contribution of the pre-opening
period to the daily price change averaged 17% for our sample stocks.
On a relative unit of time basis, the contribution of the pre-opening is
as large as that of the trading period. Moreover, our empirical evidence
indicates that Nasdaq dealers use locked market quotes as an unique
27
mechanism to indicate to others what the equilibrium opening prices
should be conditional on the overnight information. Finally, we show
that among more than 200 Nasdaq market makers, only a small fraction
of them is responsible for about 50% of the price changes during locks
and for about 35% of the locks, and the evidence suggests that there are
leading market makers among dealers who trade the same stock.
This paper, along with recent studies by Biais, Hillion and Spatt
(1996) and Madhavan and Panchapagesan (1997), enriches our under-
standing of the informational role of pre-opening prices. It suggests
several avenues for future research. Indeed, while the microstructure
literature now has a multitude of theoretical models for price discovery
during trading, there is at this stage no equivalent model for the pre-
opening coordination games, with the exception of the auction model in
Madhavan and Panchapagesan (1997). So far we have established that
the quote dynamics reveal information, but a structural interpretation
of the process remains a challenge. Moreover, we now have evidence for
three dierent opening mechanisms, namely Paris, NYSE and Nasdaq.
Both the latter and the former are screen-driven markets and therefore
more directly comparable. While there are many similarities between
the two there are some subtle and very important dierences. Which
mechanism is the most transparent and ecient in reaching consensus
about the opening price? There is no clear answer to this question at this
point. Nor is there a clear indication about how both compare to a single
batch auction. Finally, while market makers may come to a consensus
price, it remains unclear whether such a price is incentive compatible
with regard to prot taking schemes in the early stages of the trading
process.
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Table 3: Characteristics of Locked Market Quotes During the Pre-opening
and Trading Hours
Reported below are the number of locked market quotes, the frequency of locks, the average size (in dollars),
and the average duration (in minutes and in number of market quotes) of locked market quotes for sample
stocks. A lock is dened as a market quote where the bid price is greater than or equal to the ask price.
The frequency of locks is the total number of locked market quotes divided by the total number of market
quotes. The size of the lock is the bid minus the ask. The duration of the lock in minutes (or in market
quotes) is calculated from the time when the lock is initiated to the termination of the lock. Panels A, B,
C and D present summary statistics by time of the day, the absolute value of the overnight (close-to-open)
price change, the absolute value of the close-to-close price change, and daily average number of trades,
respectively. The sample period extends from October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996.
Panel A: Characteristics of Locked Market Quotes by Time of the Day
No. of Frequency Average Average Average
Time of Day Locks of Locks Size Duration Duration
(%) ($) (minutes) (quotes)
Pre-opening 8:00 { 9:30 a.m. 17449 34.9 0.48 16.0 2.7
9:30 { 9:35 p.m. 1062 4.2 0.11 25.4 5.7
9:35 { 10:30 a.m. 730 0.4 0.08 2.7 1.8
Trading Period 10:30 { 12:00 a.m. 411 0.2 0.08 3.4 1.3
12:00 { 13:30 p.m. 230 0.2 0.03 0.1 1.1
13:30 { 14:30 p.m. 198 0.1 0.02 0.1 1.1
14:30 { 16:00 p.m. 252 0.2 0.02 0.1 1.1
Panel B: Characteristics of Locked Market Quotes During the Pre-opening Period
(Sorted by Absolute Value of the Overnight Price Change)
Abs. Value of
Overnight No. of Frequency Average Average Average
Price Change Locks of Locks Size Duration Duration
(jP
ov
j) (%) ($) (minutes) (quotes)
$0 {
1
8
1117 8.2 0.15 18.4 1.4
$
1
8
{
1
4
1498 18.9 0.09 14.6 1.6
$
1
4
{
1
2
3682 33.1 0.15 11.5 1.9
$
1
2
{ 1 5305 53.6 0.30 14.0 3.4
$1 { 2 3664 72.3 0.61 24.6 6.0
$2 { 5 1902 81.8 1.38 39.2 10.4
> $5 281 82.8 4.09 41.6 9.9
34
Table 3: Characteristics of Locked Market Quotes During the Pre-opening
and Trading Hours (continued)
Panel C: Characteristics of Locked Market Quotes During the Pre-opening Period
(Sorted by Absolute Value of the Close-to-Close Price Change)
Abs. Value of
Close-to-close No. of Frequency Average Average Average
Price Change Locks of Locks Size Duration Duration
(jP
cc
j) (%) ($) (minutes) (quotes)
$0 {
1
8
1621 20.2 0.20 16.8 2.1
$
1
8
{
1
4
1132 23.4 0.20 15.0 2.0
$
1
4
{
1
2
2181 31.6 0.27 15.7 2.3
$
1
2
{ 1 3366 33.0 0.32 15.3 2.4
$1 { 2 4495 43.0 0.47 15.6 3.0
$2 { 5 4006 51.8 0.70 16.6 3.9
> $5 648 66.6 2.08 25.1 6.2
Panel D: Characteristics of Locked Market Quotes During the Pre-opening Period
(Sorted by Trading Frequency)
Daily Avg. No. of Frequency Average Average Average
No. of Locks of Locks Size Duration Duration
Trades (%) ($) (minutes) (quotes)
 416 1492 20.2 0.54 29.8 3.5
416 { 826 1379 14.3 0.50 12.6 2.0
826 { 1712 4776 33.3 0.42 16.3 2.6
1712 { 6693 9802 52.5 0.51 14.2 2.8
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Table 4: Regression Analysis of Absolute Value of Price Change and Lock Duration
The regression results below are based on the following equations:
jP
ov
t
j = + LockSize
t
+ 
t
;
jP
ov
t
j = + LockT ime
t
+ 
t
;
jP
ov
t
j = + LockQuote
t
+ 
t
;
jP
cc
t
j = + LockSize
t
+ 
t
;
jP
cc
t
j = + LockT ime
t
+ 
t
;
jP
cc
t
j = + LockQuote
t
+ 
t
;
LockT ime
t
= + LockSize
t
+ 
t
; and
LockQuote
t
= + LockSize
t
+ 
t
;
where jP
ov
j is the absolute value of the overnight (close-to-open) price change, jP
cc
j is the absolute
value of the close-to-close price change, LockSize is the size (i.e., bid price less the ask price) of the locked
market quote, dened as a market quote where the bid price is greater than or equal to the ask price,
expressed in cents. LockT ime is the duration of the locked market quote in minutes, i.e., the elapsed time
from the occurrence of a locked market quote to the rst subsequent non-locked market quote. LockQuote
is the duration of the lock in market quotes, which is the total number of locked market quotes observed
from the occurrence of a locked market to the rst subsequent non-locked market quote.
Dependent Variable
Coecient jP
ov
j jP
ov
j jP
ov
j jP
cc
j jP
cc
j jP
cc
j LockTime LockQuote
Constant 75.36

33.20

49.05

131.91

94.79

112.20

17.70

8.07

LockSize 0.88

0.72

12.02

2.68

LockTime 1.02

0.68

LockQuote 11.82

10.37

Adj:R
2
0.13 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02

Indicates signicance at the 5% level.
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Table 5: Contributions of Pre-opening and Trading Periods to Daily Price Change
The reported statistics are fractions of the daily stock price change attributable to the (1) pre-opening period, (2)
pre-lock period, (3) lock period, (4) post-lock period, and (5) trading period. The pre-opening period is from 8:00
to 9:30 a.m., the pre-lock period is from 8:00 a.m. to the time of the rst locked market quote, and the lock period
spans from the occurrence of a locked market quote until the rst subsequent non-locked market quote. The post-lock
period is from when the last locked market is unlocked until the rst market quote after 9:30 a.m., plus the time
period in-between any two lock periods (if there are multiple locks), and trading period is from the rst market
quote after 9:29 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The sample period extends from October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996.
For each stock and for a given period i, where i 2 (pre-open, pre-lock, lock, post-lock, or trading period), each day's
price change is weighted based on its contribution to the cumulative absolute price change over the sample period.
Specically, the weighted price contribution (WPC) and the relative time weighted price contribution (RTWPC) for
period i is determined as
WPC
i
=
T
X
t=1
 
jP
t
j
P
T
t=1
jP
t
j
!


P
i;t
P
t

RTWPC
i
=
WPC
i
=
P
T
t=1
Time
i;t
WPC
trading
=
P
T
t=1
Time
trading;t
where P
i;t
is the total price change for period i on day t and P
t
is the total price change on day t. The rst term
in parentheses is the weighting factor for each day. The second term in parentheses is the relative contribution of
the price change of period i on day t to the daily price change.
Weighted Price Contribution
Pre-Open
Sample WPC (%) WPC (%) WPC (%) WPC (%) WPC (%)
(Pre-open) (Pre-lock) (Lock) (Post-lock) (Trading)
Full sample 16.5 5.9 10.1 0.5 83.5
Quartile 1 16.9 8.6 7.7 0.6 83.1
Quartile 2 13.1 6.7 5.8 0.6 86.9
Quartile 3 15.5 2.9 12.1 0.5 84.5
Quartile 4 20.4 5.2 14.8 0.4 79.6
Relative Time Weighted Price Contribution
Pre-Open
Sample RTWPC RTWPC RTWPC RTWPC RTWPC
(Pre-open) (Pre-lock) (Lock) (Post-lock) (Trading)
Full sample 1.1 0.6 4.5 2.6 1
Quartile 1 1.3 0.6 7.8 4.9 1
Quartile 2 0.8 0.4 4.7 2.9 1
Quartile 3 1.1 0.2 3.1 1.8 1
Quartile 4 1.4 0.7 2.6 1.1 1
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Table 7: Regression Analysis of Innovation in Volatility
Reported below are the mean and the standard deviation (in parentheses) of innovation in volatility and
quote arrival (Panel A), and the regression results (Panel B) based on the equation:

V
t
= 
NT;NL
I
NT;NL
t
+ 
NT;NL
I
NT;NL
t

Q
t
+ 
NT;L
I
NT;L
t
+ 
NT;L
I
NT;L
t

Q
t
+ 
T
I
T
t
+ 
T
I
T
t

Q
t
+ 
t
:
The return series is constructed for each 15-minute interval using the market quotes from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00
p.m. Each 15-minute interval is classied as (1) a no trade and no lock, or (2) a no trade and lock interval
during the pre-opening period from 8:00 to 9:30 a.m. During trading hours (9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.), all
15-minute intervals are classied as trade intervals. The volatility is dened as the absolute value of the
15-minute return, and the quote arrival as the number of market quotes occurring during the 15-minute
interval. In the regression model, 
V
is the innovation in volatility, 
Q
is the innovation in quote arrival,
I
NT;NL
is a dummy variable for no trade and no lock, I
NT;L
is a dummy variable for no trade and lock,
and I
T
is a dummy variable for trade. 
V
(or 
Q
) is obtained by whitening the volatility (or the quote
arrival) time series using an AR(5) process augmented with three daily lags. For each stock in the sample,
we estimate the regression model and adjust the standard error using the Newey-West (1987) method. The
cross-sectional average and standard error of coecient estimates are reported. The sample period extends
from October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996.
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Innovation in Volatility and Quote Arrival
No Trade, No Lock No Trade, Lock Trade All
Innovation in -0.039 0.343 -0.004 0.000
Volatility (0.271) (1.196) (0.392) (0.422)
Innovation in -0.229 1.220 -0.001 0.000
Quote Arrival (2.567) (3.640) (1.520) (1.790)
Panel B: Coecient Estimates and Hypotheses Testing

NT;NL

NT;NL

NT;L

NT;L

T

T
Average Coecient -0.028 0.048 0.320 0.096 -0.003 0.201
(St. Error) (0.004) (0.004) (0.030) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012)
No. of Signicant 43 51 42 42 14 52
Coecients at 5%
Hypothesis H
0
: 
NT;NL
= 
NT;L
H
0
: 
NT;L
= 
T
H
a
: 
NT;NL
< 
NT;L
H
a
: 
NT;L
< 
T
No. of Rejections at 5% 40 42
Among 52
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Table 10: The Identity of the Top Three Leading Market Makers During the Pre-opening
for 50 of the Most Active Nasdaq Stocks
For each stock, reported below are (1) the identities (IDs) of the top three Nasdaq market makers who have the
greatest weighted price contribution during locks, (2) the name of the market maker, and (3) the count that each
market maker ranks as the #1, #2, or #3 based on the weighted price contribution during locks across all the sample
stocks. The sample period extends from October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996.
Market Ranking
Maker ID Name of Market Maker #1 #2 #3 Total
MSCO Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. 7 6 5 18
BEST Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. 7 5 5 17
GSCO Goldman Sachs & Co. 5 8 2 15
MLCO Merrill Lynch Inc. 1 4 4 9
NITE Knight Securities L.P. 2 3 4 9
TSCO Troster Singer Corp. - 4 2 6
MONT Montgomery Securities 2 4 - 6
SHWD Sherwood Securities Corp. 4 1 1 6
MASH Mayer & Schweitzer, Inc. - 3 3 6
SBSH Smith Barney Inc. 2 2 1 5
CANT Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. 1 1 2 4
HRZG Herzog, Heine, Geduld, Inc. 3 1 - 4
NEED Needham & Company, Inc. 1 - 3 4
ABSB Alex Brown and Sons Inc. 2 1 - 3
DLJP Donaldson, Lufkin, Jenrette Securities Corp. 2 - 1 3
FBCO Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. 1 - 2 3
PRUS Prudential Securities Inc. 1 - 2 3
PWJC PaineWebber Inc. - 1 2 3
JEFF Jeries & Co., Inc. 1 - 1 2
LEHM Lehman Brothers Inc. 1 - 1 2
MDLD McDonald & Company Securities, Inc. - 1 1 2
OLDE Olde Discount Corp. 1 1 - 2
PERT Pershing Trading Company, L.P. 2 - - 2
PIPR Piper Jaray Inc. - 1 1 2
ROSS Ross Securities 1 1 - 2
WEED Weeden & Co L.P. - 2 - 2
AASI ABN Amro Securities Corp. - - 1 1
ADAM Adams, Harkness & Hill, Inc. - - 1 1
DEAN Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. - - 1 1
DMGL Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Inc. - - 1 1
FBRC Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., Inc. 1 - - 1
GVRC G.V.R. Company - - 1 1
HMQT Hambrecht & Quist - 1 - 1
MADF Mado 1 - - 1
MLSI Major League Securities 1 - - 1
MSCA Marcus Schloss & Co., Inc. - - 1 1
NAWE Nash, Weiss & Co. 1 - - 1
SALB Salomon Brother Inc. - - 1 1
SBNY Sands Brothers & Co., Ltd. - - 1 1
SNDV Soundview Financial Group, Inc. 1 - - 1
UBSS UBS Securities L.L.C. - - 1 1
WSLS Wessels, Arnold and Henderson & Co. - 1 - 1
Total 52 52 52 156
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Figure 1:  Individual Market Maker Quotes and Market Quotes
During the  Pre-opening for Microsoft Corp.
Figure 1 displays the bid-ask and midpoints of individual market maker quotes and the contemporaneous
best bid and ask quotes for Microsoft (MSFT) during the pre-opening period of December 8, 1995.  The
initial dealer locked quote was recorded by Morgan Stanley.  The figure shows  how changes in the
quotes of one market maker can dominate the pre-opening.  Morgan Stanley's quotes will increase the
best bid three times and cause $7/8 of the $1 7/8 price change which occured on the pre-opening.
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Figure 2: Individual Market Maker Quotes and Market Quotes
During the Pre-opening for Chiron Corp.
Figure 2 displays the bid-ask and midpoints of individual market maker quotes and the
contemporaneous best bid and ask quotes for Chiron (CHIR) during the pre-opening period of August
1, 1996.  The  initial dealer locked quote was recorded by Hambrecht & Quist.  The figure shows that
the first locked  quote contains valuable information about the opening price.  The first quote can also
be  a noisy signal and subject to subsequent revision.
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